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We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the
good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users’ private information, she benefits from
manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them.
We derive conditions under which such manipulation determines the direction of distortions in
public good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, the public good is always underpro-
vided, whereas overprovision occurs with a manipulative provider. With overprovision, not only
high-valuation users, but also low-valuation users may obtain positive rents—users may prefer
facing a manipulative provider.
1. Introduction
 Since Samuelson’s pioneering work (1954), analyzing distortions in the provision of public
goods has become a classical topic in economics (e.g., Laffont 1988). The conventional under-
standing is that the users’ incentives result in an “underprovision” —the direction of distortion
in the public good provision is downward. For instance, Comes and Sandler (1996) note that “the
tendency for public goods to be provided at suboptimal levels is a celebrated result in public
economics.” Casual observations, however, indicate that, in real life, there are cases where some
public goods and services are often “overprovided” —the direction of distortion in the public
good provision is upward, instead of downward.
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As an example, consider the class-action lawsuits in which a group of victims consolidate
their claims into a single lawsuit. A criticism against such collective litigation procedures is that
they often lead to an excessive amount of litigation. As pointed out by legal studies, such as Mul-
lenix (2014), in many cases relentlessly pursued by class-action attorneys, some class members
do not care much about the outcome of their cases. The studies also report that excessive amount
of litigation is often linked to small compensations for class members and large fees for class
attorneys (e.g., Ulen 2011; Redish 2014). This, in fact, is one of the central reasons that eventu-
ally led the United States Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, removing the
class-action lawsuits from the jurisdiction of state courts which are deemed to be over-friendly
to attorneys representing plaintiffs.
Overprovision of industrial lobbying is also common. Expenditures on such lobbying in the
United States total nearly $3 billion annually (Drutman 2015). Collender (2013) reports that lob-
byists for defense firms commonly argue for inefficiently large levels of military procurement and
acquisition, sometimes significantly exceeding the efficient level for the industry. As pointed out
by Hansen (2012), oversized lobbying activities often lead to inefficient use of public resources,
such as construction of a “bridge to nowhere.”
The services in the examples above are non-rivalrous. That is, a single service by the
provider (a lawyer or a lobbyist) benefits multiple users (clients) who are in the same group—
each user may value the service differently, but they do not compete for it. These services are,
therefore, public goods. Then, from an economic perspective, these excessive public good provi-
sions are rather puzzling because according to the standard theory in the literature, public goods
are expected to be underprovided.
The objective of this article is to identify a new economic mechanism that results in over-
provision of a public good rather than underprovision. We study this mechanism in an agency
framework of public good provision with private information. In our model, a provider (the prin-
cipal) produces a public good for the consumption of multiple users (agents) in exchange for
monetary payments from them. Each user’s valuation for the public good is his private informa-
tion, and after all users report their valuations to the provider, she produces the good according
to the collective valuation reported by the users.
As in the standard model of screening, a user with a high valuation for the good receives
an information rent not to misrepresent his true valuation. In order to reduce this information
rent, the provider’s second-best contract distorts the size of the public good downward. Except
for the case where every user claims that his valuation of the public good is high, the provider
lowers provision of the public good from the efficient level in the optimal contract. This is in line
with the literature’s traditional result in public good provision—the public good is underprovided
in equilibrium.
This result, however, is under the assumption that, whereas the users of the public good are
opportunistic, the provider is not. Such an assumption seems to be naive. Although each user has
private information about his valuation of the public good, at the point of producing the public
good, the provider is the only party that has information about all users’ collective valuation
of the good. If possible (and profitable), the public good provider may seize the opportunity to
misrepresent the collective information sent by the users, by falsifying the information received
from one user when communicating with another user.
In practice, providers of public goods do not all have access to equally effective manipula-
tion opportunities. For some public goods or services provided directly by government organiza-
tions, for example, information manipulation may not be easy. With all bureaucratic procedures
and “red tapes,” such organizations operate in rigid environments, and may not be able to easily
manipulate information they collect. On the other hand, operating environments for the public
good providers we mentioned earlier may not be as rigid, and thus it may not be as hard for them
to engage in manipulation. In the case of class-action lawsuits, attorneys do not make individual
class member’s information public due to “attorney–client privilege,” which may enable them
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to manipulate collective information. For business lobbying, the lobbyist–client relationship is
similar to the attorney–client relationship (Armstrong and Mathews 2008), and manipulating ac-
tivities by lobbyists are not entirely unknown. Hansen (2012) reports that lobbyists act mainly
based on their “rent-seeking” incentives, noting that they have a large stake in manipulating
“lobbying-related information.”
We take the public good provider’s incentive to manipulate the collective information into
account in our model. We identify that, when the provider announces the collective valuations
to the users, she has an incentive to exaggerate it—in particular, the provider has an incen-
tive to make a user with a low value for the public good think that the other users’ valua-
tions are high. The public good provider’s incentive to manipulate information is anticipated
by the users when contracting with her. Such an anticipation provides a high-valuation user
with a stronger incentive to misrepresent his own valuation. In other words, there is a tension
between a user’s incentive to misrepresent his private information and the provider’s incen-
tive to misrepresent her collective information. To ease this tension, the public good provider
must convince the users that she would not manipulate the collective information reported by
them.
One way to convince the users that the public good provider will not falsify their reports
is designing a bunching contract that pools different collective information at the same level of
the public good. The provider will not have a reason to manipulate if the public good and the
payment levels do not change with her manipulation. More interestingly, the provider can also
eliminate her incentive to manipulate by inflating the provision of the public good and leaving a
positive rent to users with low valuations. Our result shows that, depending on the likelihood of
different user valuations, it is optimal for the provider to implement bunching or overprovision
to convince the users that she will not manipulate.
Manipulability of information may have unexpected winners and losers. The provider must
convince the users that she will not falsify the reported collective information, and this consid-
eration imposes an additional constraint on the provider’s design problem on top of the standard
incentive conditions. Modifying the second-best contract to satisfy this new constraint entails
a lower payoff for the provider. An examination of how the provider modifies the second-best
contract also reveals the effects of the manipulation opportunities on the users’ payoffs. Larger
public good sizes lead to larger information rents for high-valuation users. In addition, even low-
valuation users may end up with positive rent under the optimal manipulation-proof contract. In
other words, whereas the public good provider is worse off for having the opportunity to manip-
ulate the information reported by the users, the users themselves may benefit from the provider’s
ability to manipulate.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related stud-
ies. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 outlines the optimal contract without the provider’s
manipulation opportunities (the second-best contract), and shows that the public good is under-
provided in this case. Section 5 demonstrates that the second-best contract may be prone to the
provider’s manipulation and characterizes the optimal manipulation-proof contract. Section 6 dis-
cusses the welfare effects of the provider’s manipulation opportunities. Section 7 concludes with
some remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Related literature
 It is a classical result that public goods are underprovided. Under symmetric information
and voluntary contributions, this underprovision result is obtained when comparing the non-
cooperative equilibrium outcome to the cooperative one (e.g., Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
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1986).1 Under asymmetric information and voluntary participation, the underprovision arises
from a trade-off between efficiency and information rents (e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite 1990).2
Consequently, the literature views overprovision as an “anomaly.” The theoretical litera-
ture has studied this anomaly mainly under symmetric information. This article’s contribution
is to provide a rationale for overprovision that is due to “endogenous private information”—
information manipulation by a public good provider.3
Focusing on the preferences of economic agents, Buchanan and Kafoglis (1963), Diamond
and Mirrlees (1973) and Sadka (1977) discuss necessary conditions on those preferences for an
overprovision to arise. There are studies considering strategic tax policies, demonstrating that
overprovision may arise when there is tax exporting (e.g., Gerking and Mutti 1981), when public
goods are inputs in production (e.g., Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos 2007), or when policy
makers have Leviathan tendencies (e.g., Mintz and Tulkens 1996). All explanations in these
studies abstract from private information.
Our modeling of manipulation is similar to Dequiedt and Martimort (2015) and Akbarpour
and Li (2020). These studies focus on manipulation in environments with private goods.4 Consid-
ering a principal who can falsify received information in a multi-agent framework with correlated
private information, Dequiedt and Martimort (2015) point out that full rent extraction through
yardstick competition is no longer possible.5 As a result, simple sell-out contracts are optimal in
a vertical framework of an upstream manufacturer dealing with a retailing network under a wide
range of settings.
Akbarpour and Li (2020) study manipulation-proof auction design. They demonstrate that
the sealed-bid second-price auction is susceptible to undetectable manipulation because the auc-
tioneer can overstate the second-highest bid to increase the payment from the winner. In contrast,
no such manipulating incentive arises for the first-price auction. They, moreover, develop a gen-
eral formalization of undetectable manipulation by a mechanism designer, which also provides
a micro foundation of the manipulation-proofness constraints that we apply in our framework of
public goods. The manipulation opportunities in a public good setting are, however, more limited
than under private consumption because the provided level of a public good is naturally observed
and consumed by all users in the group. As we show, this limited form of manipulability has
nevertheless an adverse effect on the principal’s abilities to extract rents. They are economically
significant in that, depending on parameter constellations, they lead to an overprovision of pub-
lic goods.
Our article is also related to the studies of an informed principal problem following the
agent’s hidden action. In Demski and Sappington (1993), the agent exerts a costly effort, but the
result of the effort is observed only by the principal, who may have an incentive to misrepresent
the result. Sridhar and Balachandran (1997) consider a multi-agent setting, in which the principal
faces an internal and an external agent, each of who performs either the upstream or the down-
stream task. A similar manipulation problem arises in that the external agent does not observe the
internal agent’s effort directly, but only receives a possibly manipulated report from the principal
1 Cheikbossian and Sand-Zantman (2011) show that the underprovision result even persists with repeated inter-
actions that involve imperfect monitoring, while Teoh (1997) shows that information disclosure worsens the free-riding
problem that underlies the underprovision.
2 With forced, involuntary participation, Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) demonstrate that the efficient level of
the public good can be implemented in dominant strategies. Green and Laffont (1977) also study efficiency in public
good provisions by characterizing incentive compatible mechanisms in dominant strategies. Under Bayesian incentive
compatibility conditions, d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) show that, with forced participation, such an outcome
can even be achieved with budget-balanced transfers.
3 Bierbrauer and Winkelmann (2020) study public good overprovision from a mechanism design perspective. They
do not, however, consider the public good provider’s endogenous private information.
4 Dequiedt and Martimort (2006) also construct a non-manipulable mechanism for a benevolent provider.
5 Crémer and McLean (1985), Crémer and McLean (1988) show that, when the agents’ types are correlated, a non-
manipulative principal could fully extract the agents’ information rents by conditioning her transaction with one agent to
the information transmitted by another agent.
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about this effort. In contrast to our article, the principal’s manipulation incentive in these studies
concerns the manipulation of information about some agent’s individual action rather than from
manipulating the collective information of the agents.6
3. Public good provision model
 We present a model of public good provision with a provider (the principal) and two users
(the agents). The provider’s cost of producing size q ≥ 0 of the public good is given by c(q),
where c(·) is a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex function.7 We
assume that c(·) satisfies the Inada conditions: c(0) = 0, limq→0 c′(q) = 0, and limq→∞ c′(q) =
∞. User k ∈ {1, 2} values q units of the public good by θ kq. The size of the public good q is
verifiable and contractible, whereas each user’s valuation parameter θ k is his private information
(his type). The types are independently and identically distributed. Specifically, a user has the
high valuation θh for the public good with probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1), and the low valuation θl > 0
with probability 1 − ϕ, where θ ≡ θh − θl > 0.
In line with the examples in the introduction, we consider the public good provider as a
profit maximizer.8 Accordingly, the provider’s and user k’s payoffs are, respectively,
2∑
k=1
pk − c(q) and θ kq − pk ,
where pk is the payment from user k to the public good provider.
The collective value of the public good depends on the realized types of the two users. We
are either in the high-value state (H ) where both users have a high valuation for the public good,
or in the low-value state (L) where both users have a low valuation, or in the intermediate-value
state (M ) where the two users have different valuations. For each of these collective-valuation
states, we can find the first-best sizes of the public good that maximizes the sum of the provider’s
and the users’ payoffs. The first-best public good sizes satisfy the Samuelson condition—the
marginal cost of producing this first-best level is equal to the sum of the marginal values:
c′(q∗H ) = 2θh, c′(q∗M ) = θh + θl, c′(q∗L) = 2θl .
If the public good provider could directly observe the users’ valuations, she would choose to
produce these first-best quantities to maximize the benefits of the public good net of its produc-
tion costs. However, because these valuations are private information for the users, the provider
has to give them the incentive to reveal their valuations truthfully. For this purpose, the provider
offers a contract C that conditions the size of the public good and the payments from the users on
their reports about valuations. In what follows, we denote by piγ the payment charged to a user of
type i ∈ {h, l}, when all users’ reports indicate the collective value as γ ∈ {H, M, L}. Similarly,
qγ is the public good size when the collective value is indicated as γ ∈ {H, M, L} by the users’
reports. Hence, a contract C is a collection of payments and public good sizes as below:
C ≡ {(phH , qH ), (plM , qM ), (phM , qM ), (plL, qL)}.
Notice that the users are treated symmetrically: pkiγ = p−kiγ and qγ (θ ki , θ−kj ) = qγ (θ kj , θ−ki ),
where k,−k ∈ {1, 2}, i, j ∈ {h, l} and γ ∈ {H, M, L}. We postulate that the public good
provider’s offer is constrained by “fairness” restrictions. It is well-documented in experimental
studies that players in the same positions care about being treated symmetrically (e.g., Nalbantian
and Schotter 1997).9
6 Lacker and Weinberg (1989) study a case where a costly hidden action can privatize public information. Strausz
(2006) and Shin (2017) consider signals privately observed by the principal.
7 Our public good provision model is similar to the one in Laffont and Martimort (2000).
8 Our qualitative results remain unchanged if the provider is modeled as a welfare-maximizing government raising
distortionary taxes to finance the good’s production (as in Laffont and Tirole 1993).
9 Laffont and Martimort (1998) adopt a similar restriction justified by limited communication.
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Finally, we assume that each user has an option to opt out, after learning the level of the
public good and the required payment to the provider. If a user chooses to opt out, then the game
ends without any public good provision and payments, so that all parties receive their reservation
payoffs of zero. We discuss the importance of the symmetric treatment and opportunity to opt
out assumptions in our conclusion.
The timing of the interaction is summarized as follows:
1. The public good provider offers contract C to the users.
2. Each user reports his valuation i ∈ {h, l} to the provider.
3. The provider reports the collective valuation γ ∈ {H, M, L} to the users.
4. Payments are made and the public good is provided, if the users do not opt out.
In the next section, we analyze a non-manipulative public good provider, who would choose
the public good and payment levels that would truthfully reflect the reported types of the users in
stage 3. This benchmark case leads to the standard result that the public good is underprovided
and the high-valuation users get information rents. In the subsequent section, we show that such
an underprovision invites the provider’s manipulation incentive in stage 3.10 We then will show
that the optimal manipulation-proof contract may exhibit overprovision of the public good and
leave a positive rent even for a low-valuation user.
4. Non-manipulative public good provider
 We discuss the benchmark—the public good sizes in the optimal contract when the provider
cannot manipulate information reported from the users. Here, the provider’s constraints in con-
tracting for the public good provision are the users’ participation and truthful reports on their
valuation of the public good.
The public good provider’s expected payoff can be written as the expected payments that
she will receive from the users net of the cost of producing the public good:
ϕ2[2phH − c(qH )] + ϕ(1 − ϕ)[phM + plM − c(qM )]
+ (1 − ϕ)ϕ[plM + phM − c(qM )] + (1 − ϕ)2[2plL − c(qL)] (1)
= {ϕ22phH + 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)phM + 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)plM + (1 − ϕ)22plL}︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payment from the users
− {ϕ2c(qH ) + 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)c(qM ) + (1 − ϕ)2c(qL)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected cost of production
As mentioned above, the source of the first set of constraints is the voluntary participation
of the users. The following pairs of participation constraints ensure that high and low-valuation
users would not opt out of the contract after learning the intended public good and the payment
levels:
θhqH − phH ≥ 0, (2)
θhqM − phM ≥ 0, (3)
for a high-valuation user and
θlqM − plM ≥ 0, (4)
θlqL − plL ≥ 0, (5)
10 We assume that that it is too costly for the users to directly communicate with each other.
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for a low-valuation user. In addition, to induce the users to reveal their true valuations, the fol-
lowing Bayesian incentive compatibility conditions must be satisfied:
ϕ(θhqH − phH ) + (1 − ϕ)(θhqM − phM ) (6)
≥ ϕ(θhqM − plM ) + (1 − ϕ)(θhqL − plL),
for a high-valuation user and
ϕ(θlqM − plM ) + (1 − ϕ)(θlqL − plL) (7)
≥ ϕ max {θlqH − phH , 0} + (1 − ϕ) max {θlqM − phM , 0},
for a low-valuation user. The “max” operators on the RHS of (7) reflect the possibility that a
low-valuation user may misrepresent his type as type θh, and opt out after being informed of the
other user’s type (thus after learning the realized size of the public good and the payment level in
the contract).11 As shown by Matthews and Postlewaite (1989) and Forges (1999), quitting rights
of the users require such strengthening of the incentive compatibility constraints. Notice that we
do not need these “max” operators on the RHS of (6) because (4) and (5) imply that opting out
would be suboptimal for a high-valuation user after misrepresenting his type as θl .
When the public good provider cannot manipulate information from the users, she offers
the second-best contract that maximizes her expected payoff (1) subject to the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints presented above. We characterize the optimal outcome in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract Cn offered by the non-manipulative provider entails the
public good levels identified by the following first-order conditions:
c′(qnH ) = 2θh,
c′(qnM ) = max
{
θh + θl − ϕ





2θl − 2 ϕ
1 − ϕ θ, 0
}
.
A high-valuation user’s expected rent is strictly positive unless qnM = qnL = 0, and a low-valuation
user gets zero rent.
If both users have high valuations, the optimal size of the public good coincides with the ef-
ficient one—conforming to the well-known “no distortion at the top” result of standard screening
models. Incentive compatibility is the source of the information rent for the high-valuation user.
As in the standard screening model, a user with high-valuation can command information rent
by misrepresenting his type as the low-valuation. To prevent this user from misrepresenting his
type, the provider must leave an information rent to him. The provider’s optimal contract reduces
the magnitude of this information rent by distorting the size of the public good downward when-
ever at least one of the users report a low type, that is, whenever the collective valuation is low
or intermediate. This underprovision of public good can take an extreme form of a shut down
(qnL = qnM = 0), and a high-valuation user obtains no information rent. This indeed is the case
when the likelihood that users are high-valuation type is sufficiently large. When that likelihood
is not large enough, the public good levels are strictly positive, although they are distorted down-
ward.
11 Alternatively, we can impose a limited liability constraint that a contract-abiding user is assured a positive ex
post payoff. In that case, the RHS of (7) is replaced with ϕ(θl qH − phH ) + (1 − ϕ)(θl qM − phM ), and our results will
not change.
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The binding constraints in the non-manipulative provider’s problem are the participation
constraints of the low-valuation user, (4) and (5), and the incentive compatibility constraint of
the high-valuation user, (6)—see the proof of Proposition 1. The payments from the users are
obtained from these binding constraints:
plM = θlqM , plL = θlqL and
ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM = ϕ[θhqH − θqM ] + (1 − ϕ)[θhqM − θqL].
Notice that, in the second-best contract Cn, a high-valuation user’s ex post payments to the
provider, phH and phM , have some degree of freedom. We point out this flexibility in alloca-
tion of the payment here because it will be exploited in the next section, where manipulation by
the public good provider is an issue.
Our discussion here on the public good size is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If the public good provider is non-manipulative, then the optimal contract entails
only under-provision of the public good.
5. Manipulative public good provider
 In the previous section, we derived the public good provider’s optimal contract to the users
under the assumption that she cannot manipulate the information revealed by the users. We now
argue that this assumption is not innocuous—after learning that both users have low valuation,
the provider may have an incentive to misrepresent this information in a way that is undetectable
by the users.12
Although the users cannot communicate with each other, they can detect certain forms of
manipulation by the provider. It is clear that when γ = H , misrepresenting it as γ = L will
be detected by all users. Likewise, misrepresenting γ = L as γ = H will be detected. Also,
when γ = M , the provider cannot misrepresent it as γ = H or L. If γ = M is misrepresented as
γ = H , then the low-valuation user will detect the provider’s false claim. Likewise, the provider
cannot misrepresent γ = M as γ = L, because her manipulation then will be detected by the
high-valuation user.
In our model, the provider is able to misrepresent the collective valuation as γ = M when
γ = H or L. Neither user will be able to detect the provider’s manipulation in such a case. As
will be shown below, when γ = H , the provider has no incentive to misrepresent it as γ = M .
When γ = L, however, the provider’s incentive to misrepresent it as γ = M arises. That is, al-
though there are two cases in which the provider is able to manipulate information, it is when
the collective valuation is low that her incentive is an issue. The public good provider has an
incentive to “exaggerate” the collective valuation in order to increase the size of the good, but
has no incentive to decrease it.13
To see the provider’s incentive to manipulate, suppose that each user sends a message to
the contract indicating that he has a low valuation for the public good. If the provider behaves
truthfully and reports the collective valuation as low, the contract would commit her to producing
public good level qL in exchange for receiving payment plL from each of the users. The provider,
however, would have another option if she is able to manipulate the information that she collects
from one user when communicating with the other one. If she pretends to each user that the
other user had reported to have a high valuation, she would instead commit to producing qM and
would receive plM from each of the users. For this manipulation not to be profitable, the provider’s
contract should satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint for the provider:
2plL − c(qL) ≥ 2plM − c(qM ). (8)
12 Using the words in Akbarpour and Li (2020), the second-best contract is “not credible” in our model when the
public good provider is manipulative.
13 This is in line with the examples mentioned in the introduction.
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As shown above, in the second-best contract Cn, the payments plL and plM are determined by
binding (5) and (4), and pnlL = θlqnL and pnlM = θlqnM . Accordingly, when both users’ valuations
are low (γ = L), the public good provider’s payoff in Cn is 2θlqn − c(qn), where qn ∈ {qnL, qnM}
depending on whether or not she misrepresents the collective valuation of the public good. If the
















Notice that 2θlq − c(q) is concave in q and it is maximized at the first-best level of the pubic good
q∗L. In the second best contract Cn, qnL is set smaller than q∗L. Notice, however, from Proposition 1
that, when the high and low valuations are equally likely (ϕ = 1/2), the second best level of qM






) = 2θlq∗L − c(q∗L) > 2θlqnL − c(qnL).
It follows from the continuity of the second-best contract that, as long as ϕ is sufficiently close
to 1/2, the provider would prefer misrepresenting γ = L as γ = M under the second-best mech-
anism. We formalize this discussion with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The second-best contract Cn violates (8) if and only if ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ), where ϕ ≡ (θl +
θh)/(2θh) > 1/2 and ϕ ∈ (0, 1/2).
Again, the second best contract Cn is prone to the public good provider’s misrepresentation
of the users’ collective valuation—when both users report that their valuations are low to the
provider, the provider has an incentive to claim to each user that the other user’s valuation is high.
According to Lemma 1, such an incentive of the provider is an issue for intermediate values of
the likelihood that a user’s valuation is high: ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ). Within this interval, the public good
level qM is close enough to q∗L and thus the provider has an incentive to misrepresent γ = L as
γ = M after she receives each user’s information.
More intuitively, for extreme values of ϕ the provider has no incentive to manipulate the
collective valuation in Cn. When ϕ ≤ ϕ, it is unlikely that the collective value is high (γ = H ),
and thus distortion in qL to reduce a high-valuation users’ information rent in Cn is small—as a
result, the provider’s manipulation incentive to misrepresent γ = L as γ = M does not arise in
Cn. Likewise, when ϕ ≥ ϕ, it is likely that the collective value is high. Therefore, to reduce the
high-valuation users’ rents, not only qL, but also qM is distorted significantly downward in Cn—as
a result, the provider has no incentive to misrepresent γ = L as γ = M in Cn. When ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ),
the provider’s incentive to manipulate arises because qL is distorted relatively more severely than
qM .
Figure 1 below illustrates the range of qM within which the manipulation incentive of the
public good provider arises.
It is noteworthy what would go wrong for the second-best contract Cn when constraint (8) is
violated and the public good provider indeed manipulates the information that she receives from
the low-valuation users. In that case, a user would end up with a higher level of the public good
(qnM instead of q
n
L) and make a higher payment (plM = θlqnM instead of plL = θlqnL) to the provider.
Notice that a low-valuation user would be indifferent to this manipulation because the binding
participation constraints guarantee that he receives no rent whether the provider manipulates or
not. Thus, the provider’s misrepresentation is Pareto-improving ex post. The provider’s manip-
ulation incentive, however, is anticipated by the users, and as a result, Cn becomes no longer
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FIGURE 1
THE PUBLIC GOOD SIZES AND THE PROVIDER’S INCENTIVE







) + (1 − ϕ)(θhqnM − pnhM) = ϕ(θhqnM − pnlM) + (1 − ϕ)(θhqnL − pnlL).
With the provider’s misrepresentation, however, the RHS of the above equation becomes θhqnM −










M − pnlM︸ ︷︷ ︸
=θqnM
.
The strict inequality above implies that (6) will be violated—the real cost of the provider’s ma-
nipulation is due to the violation of the incentive compatibility for a high-valuation user. Hence
a high-valuation user, anticipating the provider’s misrepresentation of the collective value, will
require a larger information rent to reveal his private information truthfully.
In addition to the manipulation opportunity that we identified above for the low-value state,
there is one more undetectable way for the provider to manipulate information. When both users
report that they have high valuations, the provider can claim to each user that the other user
reported his valuation as low. To ensure that the provider will not pursue this manipulation, the
following incentive compatibility constraint should be satisfied in addition to (8):
2phH − c(qH ) ≥ 2phM − c(qM ). (9)
It is easier to curtail the provider’s manipulation incentive in the high-value state in comparison
to her manipulation incentives in the low-value state. In other words, (9) is a less demanding
constraint than (8). As mentioned in the previous section, when the incentive compatibility con-
straint (6) pins down the expected payment ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM from a high-valuation user, it
still leaves some degree of freedom in determining individual payment levels of phH and phM . In
Lemma 2 below, we show that the manipulative provider’s contract can make use of this freedom
to satisfy (9) without violating the users’ incentive compatibility or participation constraints, for
the relevant levels of the public good.
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Lemma 2. Consider public good levels such that qL ≤ qM ≤ qH ≤ q∗H , payments plL and plM
satisfying (5) and (4), and ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM given by binding (6). There exist phH and phM that
satisfy (2), (3), (7) and (9).
According to Lemma 2, the public good provider’s manipulation incentive is toward one
direction—although having an incentive to exaggerate the collective valuation, she has no incen-
tive to understate it. Again, inducing high-valuation users’ truthful reports requires downward
distortions in the public good sizes for low-valuation users, which in turn give the provider the
incentive to exaggerate the collective valuation of the users. Although the provider is able to
misrepresent γ = H as γ = M , she has no incentive to do so in Cn.
In light of the previous two lemmas, we can conclude that the optimal manipulation-proof
contract is the second-best one, Cn, if the value of ϕ is small or large (ϕ ≤ ϕ or ϕ ≥ ϕ). The
remaining task is identifying the optimal contract for an intermediate range of ϕ, where the
public good provider’s manipulation incentive is an issue. This contract should maximize the
provider’s expected payoff in (1) subject to the provider’s incentive compatibility constraints, as
well as the users’ participation constraints and the users’ incentive compatibility constraints.
As the second-best contract Cn violates (8) for ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ), within this range of ϕ, perhaps the
most natural contract that would eliminate the provider’s incentive to manipulate is a bunching
contract that does not distinguish between the case where both users report low valuation for
the public good and the case where only one of them reports low valuation, that is, qL = qM . In
this way, a low-valuation user and the provider end up with the same public good and payment
levels for both γ = L and γ = M—with this bunching, there is no reason for the provider to
misrepresent γ = L as γ = M . With our next proposition, we show that this is indeed the optimal
contract for the provider when a user is more likely to be the high-valuation type.
Proposition 2. For ϕ ∈ (1/2, ϕ), the optimal contract Cm offered by the manipulative provider








) = c′(qmL ) = max
{
2θl − 2 ϕ
2
1 − ϕ2 θ, 0
}
.
A high-valuation user’s expected rent is strictly positive unless qmM = qmL = 0, and a low-valuation
user gets zero rent.
When all users have low-valuation, the provider produces qmL = qmM and receives pmlL = pmlM
(= θlqmL = θlqmM ) from each user regardless of whether she manipulates the reported information
or not. It is straightforward to see that this arrangement sets the LHS and the RHS of (8) constraint
equal to each other, thus eliminating the provider’s incentive to manipulate information. Notice
that the public good is under-provided in Cm (qmM < q∗M and qmL < q∗L) for ϕ ∈ (1/2, ϕ). When it
is more likely that a user is the high-valuation type (the type receiving information rent), it is
optimal for the provider to reduce the source of the users’ information rents when removing her
own manipulation incentive.
In addition to the bunching presented in Proposition 2 above, there are other ways to keep
the public good provider from manipulating information. To see this, consider the binding (8)
presented below:
2plL − c(qL) = 2plM − c(qM ).
From this equation, instead of bunching the two outcomes for γ = L and γ = M , the provider can
reduce the payment plM in the RHS to discourage herself from information manipulation. Notice
that, although lowering this payment relaxes the constraint, it comes at the cost of providing
a low-valuation user with a strictly positive rent when he is paired with a high-valuation user.
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Another way to discourage the provider from manipulating information would be to inflate the
level of public good qM in the RHS, so that the value generated by it for low-valuation users
would not justify the cost of producing it. As will be shown below, when a user is more likely
to be the low-valuation type, the provider finds it optimal to use a combination of these two
approaches to deal with her own incentive to manipulate information.
In order to present our results for ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2), we first introduce the following condition.
Condition 1. 2θl q̂L − c(q̂L) ≤ 2θlq∗H − c(q∗H ), where q̂L is defined by:
c′(q̂L) = max
{
2θl − 2 ϕ(1 − ϕ)
1 − ϕ(1 − ϕ)θ, 0
}
.
When Condition 1 holds, the principal’s gain from misrepresenting the users’ collective val-
uation is exceedingly large when the reports from the users indicate γ = L. That is, the provider’s
cost to keep herself from manipulating information becomes extremely costly. Accordingly, she
will make an extreme choice in the optimal contract as we show below.14 The next proposition
presents the optimal outcome when the condition holds.
Proposition 3. Suppose Condition 1 holds. For ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2), the optimal contract Cm offered by
the manipulative provider entails a bunching outcome with overprovision of the public good:
qmH = q∗H = qmM > q∗M and qmL = q̂L < q∗L.
A high-valuation user receives a rent, and a low-valuation user receives a rent when paired with
a high-valuation user.
As mentioned above, the manipulative public good provider can prevent herself from mis-
representing the users’ collective valuation by distorting the size of public good and/or decreas-
ing the payment from the low-valuation user when he is paired with a high-valuation user. Recall
from Proposition 2 that, when it is more likely that a user is the high-valuation type (ϕ > 1/2),
the optimal way to prevent the provider’s manipulation is pooling the outcome for γ = M with
the outcome for γ = L. The bunching with public good under-provision effectively prevents the
provider’s manipulation, and at the same time, limiting her rent provision to a high-valuation user.
When it is more likely that a user is the low-valuation type (ϕ < 1/2), the optimal way to
prevent the provider’s manipulation entails increasing qM , thus increasing the cost of production
for γ = M , which in turn prevents the provider from misrepresenting γ = L as γ = M (a larger
qM implies a larger rent provision to a high-valuation user, but it is more likely that a user is the
low-valuation type). Proposition 3 exhibits an extreme case. When it becomes significantly hard
for the provider to incentivize herself for a truthful behavior, the provider must distort qmM upward
all the way to qmH (= q∗H ), and also give a strictly positive rent to a low-valuation user paired with
a high-valuation user in the optimal contract. This implies an overproduction of the public good
when the users have different valuations (qmM > q
∗
M )—when a user is more likely to be the high-
valuation type, as long as at least one of the users has a high valuation for the public good, the
provider may prefer to set the production at the first-best level corresponding to all users having
high valuation.
Comparison of qmL (= q̂L) with the conditions defining the first-best and the second-best out-
comes reveals that q̂L is in between qnL and q
∗
L for ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2) and exactly equal to qnL for ϕ = ϕ.
This implies that Condition 1 is violated at ϕ = ϕ.15 When Condition 1 does not hold, the partic-
ipation constraint (4) of the low-valuation user becomes binding in the optimal contract. As we
14 Whether or not Condition 1 holds depends on the parameter values and the cost function’s curvature. In the
working paper version, we provide a numerical example that satisfies the condition.
15 When ϕ = ϕ, the second-best outcome satisfies constraint (8) as an equality. Accordingly, 2θl q̂L − c(q̂L ) >
2θl qnL − c(qnL ) = 2θl qnM − c(qnM ) > 2θl q∗H − c(q∗H ).
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have seen in Proposition 2, one way to satisfy constraints (4) and (8) simultaneously is pooling
the two states, γ = M and γ = L, by setting the public good level qM of the intermediate-value
state equal to the public good level qL of the low-value state. As illustrated in Figure 1, however,
concavity of function 2θlq − c(q), together with the Inada condition that limq→∞ c′(q) = ∞, im-
plies the existence of another level for qM . This another level of qM achieves the same objective
but is higher than the first-best public good level q∗L. We define q̃(qL) as this higher level of qM
(> q∗L) that would satisfy constraint (8) as an equality, expressed as follows:
q̃(qL) = max {qM : 2θlqM − c(qM ) = 2θlqL − c(qL)}.
The following proposition presents the outcome in the optimal contract offered by the ma-
nipulative provider when Condition 1 is violated.
Proposition 4. Suppose Condition 1 does not hold. For ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2), the optimal contract Cm
offered by the manipulative provider entails the following public good sizes:




> q∗L, where q
m
M ≷ q∗M and qmL < q∗L.
A high-valuation user receives a rent, and a low-valuation users receives no rent.
Again, when a user is more likely to have low valuation (ϕ < 1/2), it may be optimal for
the provider to prevent her own manipulation incentive by increasing qM beyond the first-best
level q∗M . Proposition 4 exhibits cases where inducing the provider’s truthful behavior is not as
costly as in Proposition 3. Here, the provider leaves no rent to a low-valuation user by setting
the payment from him as large as the value that this user gets from the public good. At the
same time, to prevent the provider from manipulating collective information from the users, the
optimal contract inflates the size of the public good large enough in the intermediate-value state.
As a result, the optimal contract can still lead to an overprovision of the public good for γ = M .
The propositions in this section characterized the optimal contract offered by the manipula-
tive provider for the entire range of ϕ.16 For the extreme values of ϕ, the provider’s manipulation
is not an issue and the optimal contract is the same as the second-best contract given in Propo-
sition 1. If ϕ is larger than but close enough to 1/2, Proposition 2 yields the optimal contract,
which bunches the low and intermediate collective valuations at the same public good level. If ϕ
is smaller than but close enough to 1/2, the optimal contract is given either by Proposition 3 or
by Proposition 4, depending on whether or not Condition 1 holds. For these latter values of ϕ, the
public good can be overprovided and even the low-valuation users may receive a positive rent.17
In short, the provider’s manipulation incentive and hence the direction of distortion in the
public good size is determined by the likelihood of high valuation by the users. For extreme
ranges of the likelihood, the provider has no incentive to manipulate. For an intermediate range,
her manipulation incentive becomes an issue. Within that range, when it is more likely that the
users have high valuation, the public good is still underprovided. When it is less likely that the
users have high valuation, however, the provider’s manipulation incentive may lead to overprovi-
sion of the public good.
The central message in this section is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If the public good provider is manipulative, then the optimal contract may entail
over-provision of the public good.
16 For completeness, we note that when ϕ = 1/2, there is a continuum of contracts maximizing the provider’s
expected payoff. The optimal public good and payment levels are given as in Proposition 3 for these contracts, except for
the level of qM which can take any value within the set [q̂L, min{q̃(q̂L ), q∗H }].
17 In a single-agent setting, Beaudry (1994) shows that the privately informed principal may leave a rent to the
agent without private information.
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6. Welfare effects
 Having characterized the optimal manipulation-proof contract for all the parameter con-
stellations, we now provide a discussion of the welfare effects of the manipulability of collective
information. Our analysis indicates that the provider’s opportunity to manipulate comes at a cost.
When designing the contract, the provider has to persuade the users that she will not falsify
the information that they will report to her. This consideration imposes a new incentive con-
straint for the public good provision contract, on top of the standard conditions securing the
users’ participation and their truthful reporting. It follows from Lemma 1 that, as long as there
is a sufficient level of uncertainty about the users’ valuations for the public good (as long as
ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ)), this new constraint is violated by the second-best contract. In this case, the opti-
mal manipulation-proof contract brings in a lower payoff for the provider relative to the second
best.
The source of the users’ payoffs in the second-best contract is their private information. A
high-valuation user should be given an information rent, so that he would not choose to misreport
his valuation. This information rent is increasing in qL and qM , the public good levels supplied for
the low-valuation user. When high valuations are more likely than low valuations (ϕ ∈ (1/2, ϕ)),
Proposition 2 tells us that the manipulation-proofness constraint would have different effects on
these two public good levels: The optimal qL is weakly higher and the optimal qM is lower than
their second-best values. Hence the effect of manipulability on the users’ payoffs is ambiguous.
By contrast, when low valuations are more likely (ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2)), we know from Propositions 3
and 4 that the optimal levels of both qL and qM are higher than in the second best. Therefore, the
high-valuation user is better off in this case, with the introduction of the provider’s manipulation
opportunities. Proposition 3 also points to the possibility that even the low-valuation user may
receive a strictly positive payoff in the intermediate-value state. The provider tolerates leaving a
rent to this user in order to strengthen her commitment not to misrepresent the low-value state as
the intermediate-value state.
In sum, the provider’s ability to manipulate lowers her own expected payoff, but the users
may strictly prefer to interact with a provider who is known to be capable of manipulation. Ex-
amination of the change in the optimal levels of qL and qM would also give an idea on whether the
increase in the users’ payoffs compensate for the loss in the provider’s. If ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2) and there
is no overprovision of the public good (if the optimal manipulation-proof level of qM is lower
than its first-best value q∗M ), then the provider’s manipulability improves the sum of the provider’s
and the users’ expected payoffs because both qL and qM get closer to their first-best values under
the optimal manipulation-proof contract.
The next corollary follows directly from the discussion here.
Corollary 3. Suppose ϕ ∈ (ϕ, 1/2).
• If Condition 1 holds, then the users, regardless of their valuation of the public good, strictly
prefer to deal with a manipulative provider.
• If Condition 1 does not hold and qmM < q
∗
M , then the sum of all parties’ expected payoff is higher
with a manipulative provider.
The corollary above identifies conditions under which we can interpret the provider’s ability
to manipulate as a countervailing force that reduces her power to extract the users’ rents. It
suggests, at first sight, the counter intuitive result that the users would prefer a setting in which
the provider could manipulate. Yet, this statement requires a careful interpretation—if the users
can affect the institutional environment, they would be better served with more direct ways to
limit the provider’s rent extraction than doing so indirectly by taking the environment to where
the provider’s manipulation is easier.
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7. Conclusion
 In this article, we have provided a rationale for an overprovision of public goods that is
based on the presence of private information. In doing so, we analyzed contracting for a public
good between a provider and users with private valuations for the public good. The users’ private
information causes a distortion in the size of the public good offered to them and such distor-
tions may lead to the provider’s incentive to manipulate. We have shown that, once the public
good provider extracts the users’ private information, she may have an incentive to misrepresent
the collective information from the users.18 Because the provider’s manipulation incentive is ulti-
mately due to a trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction, it also arises when the provider is
a welfare-maximizer but faces a positive cost of public funds, as noted in footnote 8. Our results
suggest that the provider’s manipulation ability determines the direction of distortion in public
good provision. If the provider is non-manipulative, her optimal contract underprovides the pub-
lic good. If she is manipulative, however, public goods can be overprovided. In such cases, not
only the high-valuation users of the public good, but also the low-valuation ones may obtain pos-
itive rents. Lastly, we have shown that all users, regardless of their valuations, can receive higher
rents when the provider is manipulative, thus suggesting that, for strategic reasons, the users may
want to contract with a provider who is capable of manipulating information.
For simplicity, we assumed two users in our model, but our qualitative results hold for more
than two users. In fact, with more users, the provider’s manipulation opportunities increase. To
see this, suppose there are three users. Then the collective value of the users can be one of
the four values: γ ∈ {H, M, M, L}, where M and M represent the case with two high-valuation
users and the case with one such user respectively. The output schedule when the provider is
non-manipulative will be qnH > q
n
M




H = q∗H , qnM < q∗M , qnM < q∗M and qnL < q∗L.
Thus, when the provider is manipulative, her incentive to manipulate the collective valuation
arises. Depending on ϕ, the provider may have an incentive to misrepresent γ = L as γ = M or
M (if qnM is closer to q
∗
L, then she will misrepresent γ = L as γ = M and vice versa), and also
γ = M as γ = M . 19
Again, to make our point in a simple setup, we allowed each user to have two possible
valuations for the public good. Our qualitative results continue to hold with an enlarged set
of types. Suppose that a user’s type can be i ∈ {h, m, l}. With these three types, in our two-
user model, the collective valuation γ can have six potential values, giving the provider more
opportunities to manipulate.
One of the key assumptions in our model is that a user can opt out, if he anticipates a
strictly negative payoff after receiving the provider’s report about collective valuation of the pub-
lic good. Without such a limited liability of the users, the manipulative provider can still achieve
the second-best outcome by trading off payments from low-valuation users. The binding partici-
pation constraint for a low-valuation user, with no limited liability, is:
ϕ(θlqM − plM ) + (1 − ϕ)(θlqL − plL) = 0.
As can be seen from the equation, the provider has an extra degree of freedom—she can make a
low-valuation user’s ex post payoff positive for γ = M by decreasing plM , and negative for γ = L
by increasing plL without altering the public good sizes from the second-best level in each state.
This allows the manipulative provider to achieve the second best, but with the drawback that it
violates the user’s ex post participation constraint. In practice, such a violation may be feasible
in some situations, but not in others. For example, for a public good provision such as a local
government’s highway construction, financed by tax revenue, a user is not able to opt out. For a
18 Celik, Shin, and Strausz (2018) study the linkage between the principal’s incentive to manipulate the information
from the agents and the optimal structures of the organization. In that study, the transfers are restricted to be equal even
when the agents’ types are different, resulting in no over-production in the optimal contract.
19 Also, in our two-user model, the optimal contract allows the users to indirectly learn each other’s valuations, but
that is not the case when there are more than two users.
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public good such as a class-action lawsuit, on the other hand, one can choose to opt out of a class
action, and not be able to claim part of any settlement funds or court award that results from the
case (Klonoff 2017).
Another important assumption in our model is that the public good provider’s mechanism
treats the users symmetrically when determining the size of the public good and the payments
from the users. If the provider could condition the public good level for intermediate collective
value, qM , on which user has the high valuation and which user has the low valuation, then any
manipulation attempt by the provider would have been detectable by observing the size of the
provision. In many applications, the symmetric treatment assumption is justified by a fairness
consideration imposed on the provider. In addition, when the number of the users is large (as in
the class-action lawsuits), it may be too costly for the provider to arrange an asymmetric treatment
of the users in practice.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The non-manipulative provider’s optimal contract Cn maximizes (1) subject to (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6) and (7). We follow the usual procedure of considering a relaxed problem with only the constraints (4), (5) and (6),
and ignoring the remaining three. Because the provider’s payoff is increasing in plM and plL from low-valuation users
and the expected payment ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM from high-valuation users, (4), (5) and (6) are binding. These binding
constraints give the following expressions:
plL = θl qL,
plM = θl qM ,
ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM = ϕ[θhqH − θqM ] + (1 − ϕ)[θhqM − θqL].




H . From the expressions
of the payments from the users, it follows that a high-valuation user’s expected rent is strictly positive unless qM = qL = 0,
and a low-valuation user’s rent is always zero. What remains is showing that we can find individual levels of payments
phH and phM that would satisfy the ignored constraints of (2), (3) and (7). First, from the first order conditions for
the optimal public good levels in the proposition, notice that qnM = 0 for ϕ ≥ (θh + θl )/2θh and qnL = 0 for ϕ ≥ θl/θh.
Because (θh + θl )/2θh > θl/θh, if qnM = 0 then qnL = 0. Also, for strictly positive public good levels, qnH > qnM > qnL. Thus,
qnH > q
n
M ≥ qnL in any case. Consider now the levels of these payments which would satisfy (6) in the ex post sense:
phH = plM + θh(qH − qM ),
phM = plL + θh(qM − qL ).
It follows from the monotonicity of the public good levels (qnH > q
n
M ≥ qnL ) that (2) and (3) are satisfied with these
payments. Also, (7) holds with zero on either side of the weak inequality.






) ≥ 2θl qnM − c(qnM).
Function 2θl q − c(q) is concave in q and maximized at q∗L. It follows from the first-order conditions in Proposition 1
that ϕ̄ ≡ (θh + θl )/2θh is the lowest level of ϕ under which the provider chooses to shut down unless both users report
high values. If ϕ ≥ ϕ̄, then qnL = qnM = 0 and (8) holds as an equality. For ϕ ∈ [1/2, ϕ̄), the first order conditions of
the optimal outcome in Cn implies qnL < qnM ≤ q∗L and therefore (8) is violated. Similarly, when ϕ approaches to 0, qnL
approaches to q∗L(< q
n
M ) and (8) is satisfied. Existence of the threshold value ϕ follows from the fact that the left hand
side of (8) decreases and its right hand side increases in ϕ on the interval [0, 1/2].
Proof of Lemma 2. We first try setting payments phM and phH equal to the values that would satisfy a high-valuation
user’s incentive compatibility conditions in the ex post sense: phH = plM + θh(qH − qM ) and phM = plL + θh(qM − qL ).
The participation constraints for a low-valuation user, (4) and (5), imply that these payments also satisfy (2) and (3).
Constraint (7) holds provided that (6) is binding and the public good levels are monotonic (qL ≤ qM ≤ qH ): Pretending
to have high valuation would bring a lower payoff than the equilibrium payoff to a low-valuation user, regardless of the
other user’s type. So, if (9) is satisfied as well, then the proof is complete.
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Suppose (9) is violated with the above values of phM and phH . In such a case, we increase phH and reduce phM such
that both (6) and (9) hold as equalities:
phH = ϕplM + ϕθh(qH − qM ) + (1 − ϕ)plL + (1 − ϕ)θh(qM − qL ) + (1 − ϕ) c(qH ) − c(qM )
2
,
phM = ϕplM + ϕθh(qH − qM ) + (1 − ϕ)plL + (1 − ϕ)θh(qM − qL ) − ϕ c(qH ) − c(qM )
2
.
Constraint (3) still holds because we are reducing the payment phM that the user makes in this state of nature. Constraint
(2) is satisfied as well because c(qH ) − c(qM ) ≤ 2θh(qH − qM ) under convexity of c(·), and therefore:
phH ≤ ϕθl qM + θh(qH − qM ) + (1 − ϕ)θl qL + (1 − ϕ)θh(qM − qL )
= θhqH − ϕ(θh − θl )qM − (1 − ϕ)(θh − θl )qL ≤ θhqH .
Showing (7) holds is more involved for this case because of the “max” operators representing the user’s opportunity
to opt out of the contract. First notice that the expected equilibrium payoff of the low-valuation user is higher than the
expected payoff of pretending to be high-valuation and opting in the contract regardless of the other user’s type. This is
due to the fact that (6) is binding and the public good levels are monotonic (qL ≤ qM ≤ qH ). What remains to show is
the suboptimality of imitating a high-valuation user and then opting out depending on the type of the other user. This
imitation is not profitable when the other user has high valuation because phH is now higher than plM + θh(qH − qM ). On
the other hand, in the case that the other user has low valuation, the imitation payoff is:
θl qM − phM
= θl qM − ϕplM − ϕθh(qH − qM ) − (1 − ϕ)plL − (1 − ϕ)θh(qM − qL ) + ϕ c(qH ) − c(qM )
2
≤ θl qM − ϕplM − (1 − ϕ)plL − (1 − ϕ)θh(qM − qL )
= ϕ(θl qM − plM ) + (1 − ϕ)(θl qL − plL ) − (1 − ϕ)(θh − θl )(qM − qL ),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of c(·) again. Because this payoff is smaller than the expected equilibrium
payoff of ϕ(θl qM − plM ) + (1 − ϕ)(θl qL − plL ) for a low-valuation user, constraint (7) is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2. For proof of the proposition, we first consider a relaxed problem in Lemma A1 below where we
look for the outcome that maximizes the provider’s objective function in (1) subject to constraints (4), (5), (6) and (8),
ignoring (2), (3), (7)and (9)—we will also refer to this lemma for proofs of all remaining propositions.
Lemma A1. Suppose ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ). At the solution to the relaxed problem, payment levels are given by the binding con-
straints (5), (6) and (8). The public good levels qH , qM and qL are chosen to maximize:
ϕ2[2θhqH − c(qH )] + ϕ(1 − 2ϕ)[2θl qM − c(qM )] + (1 − ϕ(1 − ϕ))[2θl qL − c(qL )] (A1)
+2ϕ(1 − 2ϕ)(θh − θl )qM − 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)(θh − θl )qL,
subject to
2θl qM − c(qM ) ≥ 2θl qL − c(qL ). (A2)
Proof. Because the objective function is decreasing in phH , phM , plL and constraint (8) is relaxed with a lower value of
plL, constraints (5) and (6) are binding for the outcome solving the relaxed problem. It follows from Lemma 1 that (8) is
binding for ϕ ∈ (ϕ, ϕ). We can rewrite the expected payment to the provider by substituting in these constraints:
ϕ22phH + 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)phM + 2ϕ(1 − ϕ)plM + (1 − ϕ)22plL
= 2θl qL + ϕ22θhqH + ϕ(1 − 2ϕ)2θhqM − ϕ(1 − ϕ)2θhqL + ϕc(qM ) − ϕc(qL ).
Once the expected cost of public good provision is taken into account, the provider’s objective function reduces to the
objective in (A1). Similarly, constraint (4) can be rewritten as (A2) after substituting in the binding constraints of (5) and
(8).
We now move on to the proof of Proposition 2. We will start with ignoring (2), (3), (7) and (9) constraints and
maximizing the provider’s objective function subject to constraints (4), (5), (6) and (8) only, as in Lemma A1. The solution
to the relaxed problem will be the one identified by the proposition. Because the solution in the proposition satisfies the
hypothesis of Lemma 2, there exists an outcome that solves the relaxed problem and that satisfies the ignored constraints.
For ϕ > 1/2, the objective function (A1) is convex in qM . Therefore constraint (A2) is satisfied as an equality at the
solution to this maximization. This equality holds when qM = qL. Given concavity of function 2θl q − c(q), the equality
C© The RAND Corporation 2021.
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may also be satisfied when one variable is strictly higher than the other. This will not be the case for the outcome solving
the maximization problem: Holding 2θl qM − c(qM ) and 2θl qL − c(qL ) constant, the objective function is decreasing in
both qL and qM (when ϕ > 1/2). This proves that the optimal outcome is a bunching outcome (qM = qL ). The first order
condition yields:
c′(qM ) = c′(qL ) ≥ 2θl − 2 ϕ
2
1 − ϕ2 θ ,
where the weak inequality holds as equality if qM = qL > 0.
Finally, Lemma 2 implies that we can find individual levels of phM and phH (for instance, phM = θl qL and phH =
θl qL + θh(qH − qL )) that satisfy the ignored constraints (2), (3), (7) and (9).
Proof of Proposition 3. Ignoring constraints (2), (3), (7) and (9), it follows from Lemma A1 that the provider’s problem
turns into maximization of (A1) by choosing qH , qM and qL subject to (A2). When we ignore (A2) as well, the problem is
an unconstrained optimization problem and the first order conditions yield the values of outputs qH , qM , and qL as stated
in the proposition. The payments plL, plM , and ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM are given by binding constraints (5), (6) and (8):
pmlL = θl qmL ,




) − c(qmL )
2
,




) − c(qmL )
2





The solution satisfies the ignored constraint (A2) because:
2θl qM − c(qM ) = 2θl q∗H − c(q∗H ) ≥ 2θl q̂L − c(q̂L ).
The existence of the individual values of phH and phM satisfying the ignored constraints (2), (3), (7) and (9) follow
from Lemma 2. For instance, setting these payments equal to each other would work:
phH = phM = θl qL + ϕ c(qH ) − c(qL )
2
+ (1 − ϕ)θh(qH − qL ).
Proof of Proposition 4. Following the proof of the previous propositions, we maximize the provider’s objective function,
ignoring constraints (2), (3), (7) and (9). The payments plL, plM , and ϕphH + (1 − ϕ)phM are given by binding (4), (5),
(6) and (8) constraints:
pmlL = θl qL,
pmlM = θl qmM ,
ϕpmhH + (1 − ϕ)pmhM = θl qmL + ϕθl
(
qmM − qmL
) + (1 − ϕ)θh(qmM − qmL ) + ϕθh(qmH − qmM).
From Lemma A1, this problem turns into maximization of (A1) by choosing qH , qM and qL subject to (A2). The
constraint is binding—otherwise, the first order conditions yield that qM = q∗H and qL = q̂L, violating (A2) because:
2θl qM − c(qM ) = 2θl q∗H − c(q∗H ) < 2θl q̂L − c(q̂L ).
Holding 2θl qL − c(qL ) and 2θl qM − c(qM ) constant, the objective function is decreasing in qL but increasing in qM (for
ϕ < 1/2). This proves that qL < q∗L and qM = q̃(qL ), where q̃(qL ) = max{qM : 2θl qM − c(qM ) = 2θl qL − c(qL )}. Because
q∗M is the the maximizer of (θh + θl )qM − c(qM ), if the gap between θh and θl is small enough, q∗M will be in between q∗L
and q̃(qL ), implying that qM = q̃(qL ) > q∗M . If the gap between θh and θl is not small enough, then qM = q̃(qL ) < q∗M .
Lemma 2 implies that we can find individual levels of phM and phH that satisfy the ignored constraints (2), (3), (7)
and (9).
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